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Abstract
The development of the energy policy of the European Union (EU) has been accompanied by organizational reforms of the
EU’s energy bureaucracy. Much attention has been paid to Commission President Juncker’s reorganization of the European
Commission, including how this has influenced the Energy Union initiative. The establishment of EU agencies has also ex-
panded the EU administration and the capacity for developing new initiatives and coordinating implementation of EU
legislation. However, recent research has not been sufficiently connected to policy studies on energy, climate and envi-
ronment. This article analyses the extent to which two EU agencies—the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators,
and the European Environmental Agency—augment the policymaking capacity of the Commission by providing informa-
tion that aids its work. The article ends with a discussion of the potential implications of agencification.
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1. Introduction
The EU’s energy policy has expanded, most recently with
broad initiatives like the Energy Union as well as spe-
cific policy developments like the Clean Energy Package
(European Commission , 2016). The organizational struc-
tures in place at the EU level have also evolved. Much
attention has been paid to President Juncker’s reorga-
nization of the Commission to improve horizontal coor-
dination, including how this has influenced the cross-
cutting Energy Union initiative (Burgin, 2018). However,
other changes have not merely re-structured, but also
expanded the EU’s administration: agencification refers
to the establishment of EU agencies that are executive-
administrative entities operating at varying distances
from politics. Such agencies provide technical, scientific
and managerial expertise, and have mushroomed over
the last two decades. A growing literature has examined
the emergence and impact of EU agencies in general (see
e.g. Blauberger & Rittberger, 2015; Busuioc, Groenleer,
& Trondal, 2012; Dehousse, 2008; Egeberg & Trondal,
2011, 2017; Groenleer, 2009; Kelemen & Tarrant, 2011;
Tarrant & Kelemen, 2017; Wonka & Rittberger, 2010)
and what this development means for the EU (Bickerton,
Hodson, & Puetter, 2015; Genschel & Jachtenfuchs,
2015). However, this stream of research has not been
sufficiently linked to policy studies, including energy, en-
vironment and climate policy.
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EU agencies are positioned to make a difference by
providing expertise that can underpin new legal initia-
tives as well as help to implement and monitor exist-
ing legislation. By facilitating EU-wide data collection,
they provide a better basis for EU policy than aggre-
gating national data—the latter might be coloured by
national interests, or be incomparable due to differing
sources and methods (Busuioc & Groenleer, 2014). EU
agencies recruit technical experts (Egeberg, Gornitzka,
& Trondal, 2017) who give advice and work together
with the Commission in developing regulation (Blom,
Suijlekom, Versluis, & Wirtz, 2014; Jevnaker, 2015;
Rimkute, 2015). Although EUagencies havemultiple prin-
cipals (Dehousse, 2008), they havemost contact with the
Commission (Egeberg, Trondal, & Vestlund, 2015). The
Commission may use the information it receives from
EU agencies in several ways—to solve problems instru-
mentally, or to substantiate or legitimize policy choices
(Rimkute &Haverland, 2015). EU agencies expand the ca-
pacities of the Commission by providing it with special-
ized information, as EU agencies are ‘assumed to offer
greater transparency, expert authority, flexibility, better
informed decisions and better implementation’ (Wolff
& Schout, 2013, p. 306). EU agencies may become as-
sets for the Commission, which in turn could gain further
leverage vis-à-vis the other EU institutions. As such, agen-
cification in the policy areas of energy and climate policy
could strengthen the Commission’s capacity for develop-
ing policies under the umbrella of the Energy Union.
Scientific, technical and political expertise is not
unique: there are academics, consultants and specialist
practitioners in abundance across Europe. What enables
EU agencies not just to deliver specialized information,
but also to provide the Commission with expertise that
the latter finds relevant to its work? This article examines
the conditions that must be met for the Commission to
see information provided by EU agencies as useful. Tak-
ing an organizational perspective, we compare the role
of organizational characteristics in facilitating the provi-
sion of information that the Commission regards as use-
ful. Here we focus on two EU agencies in order to inves-
tigate the implications of agencification for the Energy
Union: the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regula-
tors (ACER) is involved in energy issues, whilst the Euro-
pean Environment Agency (EEA) deals with environment
and climate issues. The following section outlines our an-
alytical approach before we delve into our two case stud-
ies and compare the contributions of these agencies to
the Commission’s work. The analysis shows that informa-
tion provided by these two agencies is found to be use-
ful for the Commission, and we trace this back, among
other things, to the similarities in organizational struc-
ture of the Commission on the one hand, and our two
EU agencies on the other hand. The article ends with a
discussion of the potential implications of agencification
for EU policymaking.
2. Examining the Provision of Useful Information
The Commission today does not lack information: in-
stead, it faces an overload of available information. The
challenge is not to provide information as such, but to
provide relevant information tailored to meet the needs
of policymakers. Identifying the extent towhich the Com-
mission regards the input it receives from EU agencies as
useful to its work is not a trivial matter. It concerns not
only the assigned value of expert knowledge, but also the
degree to which such information can be utilized by the
Commission in its policymaking processes. As the Com-
mission has experienced staff with extensive substantial
and procedural knowledge, it presumably has less need
for information that can be obtained in-house. However,
the Commission is more likely to find additional informa-
tion provided by EU agencies relevant or helpful if this
complements the Commission’s own expertise. An EU
agency must take into account the needs of the Commis-
sion and supply relevant information that aids or com-
plements the Commission’s expertise. We measure such
‘usefulness’ by assessing the extent towhichmembers of
the Commission describe agency inputs as useful. Here
we include statements on relevance, usefulness and in-
terest, as well as descriptions of what is seen as the Com-
mission’s lack of in-house expertise, andmentions of the
need for complementary expertise.
Here we consider factors that facilitate interaction
between EU agencies and the Commission so that the
latter recognizes the benefits of information provided by
the former. Rather than considering factors that enable
information provision by agencies per se, we seek to ex-
plain how agencies provide information that is deemed
useful by the Commission itself. Drawing on organi-
zational theory—which holds that organizational struc-
ture and demography affect organizational behaviour
(Egeberg, 2012)—we argue that the ability of EU agen-
cies to deliver information useful to the Commission
depends on the organizational characteristics of these
agencies as well as those of the Commission.
Firstly, the organizational structure of an EU agency
may shape its ability to deliver relevant information. As
we are interested not in organizational behaviour as
such, but in organizational behaviour towards an en-
vironment, we draw on the concept of ‘organizational
congruence’ (Kieser & Kubicek, 1992; Saerbeck, 2014):
an organization is expected to be more successful if its
organizational structure fits with its environment. For
example, Klüver (2012) found that staff in EU interest
groups with an organizational structure similar to that
of the Commission were able to specialize and become
experts in their field. In turn, this specialization enabled
them to become part of a policy community that also
included Commission officials. As networked specialists,
they were adept at monitoring developments within the
Commission, and could prepare for the provision of rel-
evant information needed by the Commission (Klüver,
2012). Thus, organizational congruence facilitated net-
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work building and monitoring, helping these experts to
provide information that the Commission found useful
and—perhaps as importantly—timely. Following Klüver,
we argue that organizational congruence strengthens
inter-organizational information exchange because of
shared tasks and topics. The more similarity in organi-
zational structure of an EU agency to that of the Com-
mission, the more likely is information exchange to oc-
cur.We expect an EU agencywhose internal organization
resembles or even ‘overlaps’ that of the Commission to
be more adept at delivering relevant information to the
Commission. Here, we compare the horizontal and verti-
cal specialization of the EU agency with that of the ‘lead’
Directorates-General (DGs) in a policy-area (i.e., the DG
responsible for a given policy-area). This shared special-
ization enables an EU agency to work on similar tasks
as the Commission, which is conducive to network build-
ing. In turn, this enables the agency to monitor develop-
ments in the Commission. The ability to pick up signals
is vital for the agency to be able to deliver relevant infor-
mation in a timely manner.
A second major organizational variable is demogra-
phy. Personal networks enable EU agency staff to tune
into not just the working mentality of their counterparts,
but the political signals as well. Thereby, the EU agency
can adjust its behaviour accordingly—in order to pro-
vide relevant and targeted information to the Commis-
sion. We expect the terms of recruitment and employ-
ment to shape the ability of an agency to deliver infor-
mation that the Commission regards as relevant. The
agency’s demography is also related to the importance
of networks. Previous research has found length of ser-
vice of staff to be an important organizational charac-
teristic for staff behaviour (Egeberg, 2012). We argue
that the terms of employment in an agency define its
ability to interact with the Commission DGs: Tempo-
rary employment weakens agency personnel’s ‘technical
and scientific knowledge on the policy problem, admin-
istrative and procedural knowledge…as well normative
and diplomatic knowledge’ (Bauer, 2006, p. 30). More-
over, it hinders the establishment of personal networks
with contact persons in the targeted division. Thus, con-
tract length will be an important determinant for an EU
agency’s ability to deliver relevant and timely informa-
tion to the Commission. Low staff rotationminimizes the
risk for loss of institutional memory and helps to facili-
tate and strengthen personal ties, build trust and hence,
a professional network with relevant persons within the
DGs. Overall, the demography of the agency in question
will facilitate the provision of information that the Com-
mission regards as relevant.
We conducted 22 semi-structured interviews with in-
dividuals well positioned to participate in or closely ob-
serve the agencies, and particularly their contact and in-
teraction with the Commission. Informants came from
various levels within the two EU agencies as well as from
the Commission, with interviews with high-level repre-
sentatives and policy officers. We also interviewed close
observers such as national agencies and interest groups1.
Informants were queried about the nature of the rela-
tionship in general and the extent of interaction and co-
operation between staff in the EU agency and the Com-
mission, as well as about informal contacts. Moreover,
we asked informants about the role of the organizational
setup and demography of EU agencies for coordinating
with the Commission. To measure complementary infor-
mation, we asked informants to compare the in-house
expertise of the EU agency with that of the relevant divi-
sion in of the Commission. In addition, we asked Com-
mission representatives whether, when and how they
made use of information provided by ACER or EEA. Fi-
nally, we asked the interviewees whether other factors
might affect the relationship between the Commission
and EU agencies, in order to get better insights into this
hitherto unexplored area. Documentary data were col-
lected from official documents published by the selected
EU agencies as well as from the Commission. We studied
the organigrams of the selected agencies and the Com-
mission in order to study the level of organizational con-
gruence and to identify structural similarities between
sender and recipient. Here, we compared the relevant
Commission Directorate-General (DG) with the respec-
tive agency (e.g. ACER–DG Energy). We checkedwhether
the same specialization principle had been applied for
the division of labour. For the role of demography, we
examined the length of postings within each agency.
3. ACER and EEA: How to Provide Information Actually
Used by the Commission?
In this section, we consider the organization and de-
mography of ACER and EEA, before assessing the extent
to which they provide information that the Commission
finds useful. This is followed by a comparative discussion.
3.1. The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy
Regulators
ACERworks together with the Commission in developing
harmonized rules for cross-border electricity and gas net-
works (‘network codes’), and in allocating EU funding to
help build prioritized cross-border networks (‘projects of
common interest’) (EU, 2009b, 2009c, 2013). ACER also
collects data onwholesale energymarkets across Europe
in order to monitor for market abuse (EU, 2011).
3.1.1. Organizational Congruence
ACER has four operational departments: electricity,
gas, market surveillance and conduct, and market in-
1 Interviews were conducted between 2013 and 2015, each lasting 30–90 minutes. Interviews 1–10 concerned the EEA: number 1–3 and 10 were with
Commission staff and number 4–9 with members of the EEA. Interviews 11–22 concerned ACER: number 14–17 and 22 were with agency staff; 11, 12
and 18–20 with Commission staff; number 13 was with an interest group representative, and number 21 with a national agency.
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tegrity and transparency. The electricity and gas depart-
ments concentrate on network codes, retail markets and
projects of common interest within their respective sec-
tors, while the market monitoring departments keep
a keen eye on financial transactions in wholesale elec-
tricity and gas markets. ACER activities are related to
Directorate B (internal energy market) within the Com-
mission’s DG Energy, which is specialized by function:
unit B1 ‘Networks & Regional Initiatives’ deals with net-
work construction, including projects of common inter-
est; and unit B2 ‘Wholesale markets; electricity & gas’
is involved in harmonizing network management (net-
work codes). ACER and the Commission do not seem
very congruent in terms of their internal organization.
In ACER, the internal division of labour is partly by sec-
tor, partly by function, whereas the Commission has a
‘purer’ functional specialization. However, we noted an
informal use of the sector principle for the Commission:
Despite the absence of separate units for electricity and
gas, there is an informal distribution of labour along sec-
tor lines within the Directorate B units. For electricity,
for instance, it was in practice ‘quite clear who was sup-
posed to talk to whom’ (Interview 11).
A high degree of specialization facilitated contact and
network building between staff members in ACER and
the Commission. Informants from both sides noted the
low number of people that they needed to coordinate
with within the other organization (Interviews 11, 12, 14,
16). This means that Commission staff can get well ac-
quaintedwith the peopleworking in ACER (Interviews 11,
12, 14, 16). Moreover, both the Commission and ACER
were involved in tasks related to network-code devel-
opment and projects of common interest. Joint involve-
ment in processes fostered regular exchange at all lev-
els. There were multiple contact points between ACER
and the Commission regarding implementation of exist-
ing legislation or the preparation of new legislation, in-
cluding on market design (Interviews 11, 12, 14, 16). Re-
garding market monitoring, staff in both organizations
were involved in the process of preparing the implemen-
tation of legislation, and had extensive contact since they
were working on similar issues. Following the comple-
tion of this process in December 2014, however, ACER
was to continue to focus on the monitoring of finan-
cial energy markets, whereas the Commission would be
less involved in this area (Interview 16). Overall, our in-
terviewees indicated that involvement in the same pro-
cesses was more important for inter-organizational con-
tact than the formal specialization principle. In sum, then,
the combination of high specialization of staff in both or-
ganizations and participation in the same processes facil-
itated networking, contact and exchange of information
between the Commission and ACER.
3.1.2. Demography
ACER employs temporary agents (5-year contracts), con-
tract agents (max. 3 years), and seconded national ex-
perts (2 years). There were routines for maintaining insti-
tutional memory despite staff turnover, with emphasis
on documentation (e.g. writing manuals) (Interview 22).
ACER consciously recruited personnel with substantial
experience within the field (Interview 22). Most employ-
ees were already familiar with the issues at hand. Several
informants in ACER noted that they had been in contact
with the Commission prior to working for ACER. Thus,
as regards networking, recruiting personnel already en-
gagedwithin the field seemsmore important than length
of employment. Hiring networked staff facilitated over-
all interaction between ACER and the Commission. Fur-
ther contact was also facilitated by the low number of
Commission staff involved in each specialized field, along
with the joint involvement of the Commission and ACER
in formal processes. Staff from the two organizations ei-
ther already knew each other, or found it easy to become
acquainted. Such personal networks aided the informal
exchange of information between ACER and the Com-
mission. While demographic changes (turnover) could
pose a challenge, this was ameliorated by the extensive
contact between ACER and the Commission due to their
joint involvement in regulatory processes. However, we
should mention that, as of our interview period, signifi-
cant turnover had not yet really had the time to occur.
3.1.3. Discussion: ACER—Information Useful to the
Commission?
As noted, organizational structure and demography fa-
cilitated contact and networking between ACER and the
Commission. To what extent did this lead the Commis-
sion to see input from ACER as useful? Informants from
the Commission explained that they had in-house exper-
tise on ‘internal market issues’ themselves, mentioning
network codes and projects of common interest. As re-
gards market monitoring, however, they noted ACER’s
expertise and their own lack of such expertise—a point
even highlighted in the preamble of the relevant EU leg-
islation (EU, 2011). It was emphasized that market moni-
toring and oversight over individual transactions was not
the type of activity that the Commission should conduct
(Interview 12). The Commission relied more on informa-
tion fromACER onmarketmonitoring, and less so on net-
work management and construction. Although acknowl-
edging the Commission’s own expertise, informants ac-
knowledged the greater expertise within ACER at the
level of detail (Interviews 11, 12, 13). ACER staff gener-
ally hadmore expertise than theCommission on the tech-
nically detailed content of the electricity network codes,
for example (Interview 13). Commission staff confirmed
this, adding that it would have been more difficult for
them to work on the details (like network codes) for the
internal energy market without the deeper technical in-
sights provided by ACER (Interview 11). Given the techni-
calities in question, discussing these issues would have
been more difficult for the Commission (Interview 11).
When going through member-state comments in comi-
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tology on network codes, the Commission would con-
sult with ACER (Interview 11). Not only did this lessen
the Commission’s workload, the Commission also made
strategic use of ACER’s expertise to garner support for
its own comitology proposals. The Commission invited
ACER to comitology meetings as an expert to explain sec-
tions in a givennetwork code to (sceptical)member-state
representatives (Interview 19).
The Commission viewed ACER as a ‘service provider’
that supplied the Commission with information on mar-
ket developments within the electricity and gas sectors.
ACER outputs, like the annual market monitoring report,
were highlighted as useful, although the Commission also
thought that these could have been more closely tar-
geted. A Commission informant noted that this informa-
tion was very detailed and needed a clearer narrative in
order for the overall picture to emerge fromall the details
(Interview 12). ACER was referred to as a ‘daughter com-
pany’ that served as a major tool for implementation (In-
terview11). The high specialization of ACER’swork,which
complemented that of the Commission, contributed to
making input from ACER very useful to the Commission.
While ACER’s in-depth expertise was in demand,
some informants pointed out that its internal decision-
making process reduced the extent to which the Com-
mission could rely on ACER. Representatives of all 28 EU
national energy regulators sit on the board of ACER, and
hold a prominent position within the agency. As a result,
content was watered out to make it politically accept-
able to all. As ACER output could be heavily coloured
by national interests, the Commission saw the need to
take a more active role in re-writing draft network codes,
for better harmonization (Interview 13). ACER’s inter-
nal decision-making processes were seen as spurring
greater involvement of the Commission in developing
legislation (e.g. network codes), where the Commission
made changes to what had been received from ACER.
A stronger role for the ACER director vis-à-vis the board
might have fostered stronger input from ACER that could
be included in final comitology drafts.
In general, however, ACER was praised for its in-
depth information, and the Commission relied on ACER
for the provision of technical expertise. The organiza-
tional structure, which was more congruent in practice
than on paper, ensured relevance and the creation of
networks. The role of demography—recruitment and
tenure—was less important to the creation of networks.
All in all, the Commission saw ACER as a provider of use-
ful information.
3.2. The European Environment Agency
The EEA is urged to ‘provide sound, independent informa-
tion on the environment…for those involved in develop-
ing, adopting, implementing and evaluating environmen-
tal policy’ (EEA, 2018a) so that it may formulate and im-
plement environmentally sustainable policies (EU 2009a,
Art. 1, para. 2a).
3.2.1. Organizational Congruence
EEA is organized along functional lines, similar to the
Commission’s DG Environment and DG Climate Action,
with which the EEA collaborates. Closer examination of
the tasks of the EEA as compared with to the topics
discussed within DG Environment and DG Climate re-
veals considerable overlapping. While, for example, the
EEA unit ‘climate change, energy and transport’ studies
climate-change impacts and mitigation processes (EEA,
2018b), DG Climate Action evaluates the effectiveness of
European and international climate policies, develops an
international carbon market and is responsible for the
European Emission Trading System (European Commis-
sion, 2018a). Directorate ‘C’ of DG Environment is chiefly
responsible for matters concerning the marine environ-
ment and the quality of water and air (European Commis-
sion, 2018b); this is paralleled by the EEA unit ‘natural
capital and ecosystems’ that focuses on, inter alia, bio-
diversity, water and marine environment (EEA, 2018b).
That said, the EEA was heavily involved in assisting the
organizational setup of DG Climate Action (Interview 2),
which might have led to the similar setup of the latter.
Although the EEA complements the organizational
structure of its parent DGs (DG Environment and DG
Climate), interviews revealed that exchange between
this EU agency and the Commission has been stimulated
mainly by the actions of top-management officials. Rec-
ognizing the advantages of cooperation, they took ac-
tion to ensure that EEA staff-members were invited to
inter-service consultations of the Commission and to en-
sure synchronization of work programmes (Interviews 1,
4, 5, 6; see also Groenleer, 2009; Martens, 2010). More-
over, cooperation between the Commission and EEA em-
anated from evolving practice and not from organiza-
tional congruence. In the first years of its existence, the
EEA operated from within DG Environment. Moreover,
most of its staff were former Commission employees
(Interview 2). Although Commission staff would sporad-
ically consult the organigram of the EEA to identify rel-
evant counterparts (Interview 1), they tended to build
on existing relationships. These relationships had been
established at previous events, via colleagues, or facili-
tated by the EEA liaison office in Brussels (Interviews 3,
4, 5, 6, 8). In sum, already-established personal relation-
ships fostered the exchange of information rather than
organizational congruence.
3.2.2. Demography
Although the overall number of permanent EEA staff has
increasedover the years, roughly 40%of EEA staff in 2011
consisted of contract agents and seconded national ex-
perts (Interview 6; COWI, 2013). Many professional staff
leave after one to eight years. In practice, the EEA found
informal ways to extend contracts (Interview 7), but in-
formal channels of communication to the EU institutions
might be lost due to staff rotation. Rebuilding such chan-
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nels for intra- and inter-organizational relationships takes
time and resources (Interview 7). Studies also reveal a
‘certain delay in filling the established posts’ of the EEA
(COWI, 2013). Thus, the EEA risked losing valuable ex-
pertise, because of employees leaving before they had
a chance to train their replacements properly—and that
involves expertise vital to the EEA, to ensure the qual-
ity of their products and their ability to act, as our re-
spondents pointed out (Interview 1, 4, 7, 9). To avoid loss
of expertise and networks, the EEA focused on continu-
ously expanding its data-storage systems and developing
smart recruitment strategies. Thus, many EEA staff mem-
bers had previously worked on environmental issues in
other institutions on various levels (Interview 6). They
weremore likely to be already acquaintedwithmembers
of the Commission, which has further facilitated initial
contact andmutual trust. In sum, although the EEA found
ways to circumvent the challenges of temporary staff em-
ployment, it still struggled not only with loss of institu-
tional memory and expertise, but also with the loss of
personal networks.
3.2.3. Discussion: EEA—Information Useful to the
Commission?
The founding regulation urges the EEA to avoid activities
‘duplicating the existing activities of other institutions
and bodies’ (EU 2009a, art. 3). This recommendationwas
followedup through an agreement between theDirector-
General of DG Environment and the Executive Secretary
of the EEA, stating that both organizations should com-
plement rather than duplicate each other’s work (Inter-
view 1). Organizational congruence might have had pos-
itive effects on the frequency of information exchange
between the EEA and the Commission’s DGs. As we have
seen, however, this cannot in itself have been sufficient
to foster information exchange, as the top management
in these organizations saw the need for routines that
could ensure that this would happen. That goes con-
trary to our initial assumption. By contrast, demogra-
phy seems to have facilitated contact and networking be-
tween EEA and the Commission, thereby confirming our
assumption on that point.
Towhat extent did the Commission define EEA inputs
as useful? Intervieweesmentioned regular exchanges on
technical as well as policy-related contents and issue-
framing, between members of the EEA and members of
the Commission operating on all levels (Interview 1, 3,
4; Saerbeck, 2014). Moreover, members of the Commis-
sion considered information provided by the EEA as help-
ful (Interview 1, 3, 4, 8):‘[i]n many respects, the agency
may be regarded as an advisory body to the Commission’
(Khuchua, 2009, p. 91). The Commission itself also re-
ferred to the EEA as one of its most important partners
(Interview 3; Egeberg & Trondal, 2011). Approximately
70% of Commission staff at the administrative level work-
ing on issues related to the environment and climate re-
porting using information provided by the EEA when for-
mulating policies (COWI, 2013; Saerbeck, 2014). As one
informant from the Commission put it, ‘we do not rely
on the EEA entirely, of course, for information…but the
information from the agency is hugely valuable’ (Inter-
view 1). These findings relate to the limited capacities of
the Commission: as one Commission informant pointed
out concerning cooperation with the EEA: ‘the actual de-
velopment stage of the policy…normally only one or less
than one person is working for one policy area. Those
individuals will cultivate relationships with EEA counter-
parts’ (Interview 10). The same informant added that it
was ‘necessary to have scientific information that is prov-
able and scientifically…and legally sound, and the EEA
with its vast range of information…is very useful indeed’;
further, that the ‘credibility of the agency’s reporting is
generally higher’ (Interview 10). Commission members
regarded EEA information as not only useful, but even
essential to their work.
3.3. Comparing Agencies: Aiding the Commission
What factors made it possible for the two EU agencies
to provide information that the Commission considered
useful? First, we found that organizational congruence
strengthened the usefulness of information provided by
the agencies. Specifically, highly specialized work on sim-
ilar topics fostered contact with the Commission, be-
cause thismeant that rather small groups of peoplewere
working on the same issues across the agency and the
Commission (as with DG Energy and ACER). However,
agency–Commission contact was also facilitated by for-
mal arrangements like management-planned dialogue
(EEA) and joint involvement in the same regulatory pro-
cedures (ACER). The organizational similarities between
agency and Commission were not complete, but the
organization of work triggered contact and facilitated
networking between the agencies and the Commission.
However, in the absence of joint involvement in formal
processes, additional steps might be required to ensure
contact. Second, that agency staff had pre-existing net-
works with the Commission was important for the latter
in terms of judging whether the information provided by
the agencies was useful. Demography was important for
the EEA, but not for ACER, where recruitment and tenure
played less of a role for contact and networking with the
Commission, due to the highly specialized nature of the
tasks involved. There was a small number of people in
ACER and DG Energy working on the same issues, and,
due to joint involvement, they would meet regularly any-
way. In contrast, demographywas important for the Com-
mission’s perception of information from the EEA as use-
ful: some EEA staff members had previously worked for
the Commission, and this positioned them with strate-
gic networks to the Commission that they could use to
highlight the usefulness of their agency’s information to
Commission members. Nevertheless, for the EEA, rapid
turnover remained a challenge, so the agency sometimes
sought to bend the rules in order to extend contracts.
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We found that the Commission was more likely to
consider and act on information provided by EU agencies
if they considered it to be useful. For example, the EEA
was actively involved in the preparation and drafting of
a Commission proposal because the agency provided ex-
pertise that complemented the needs of the Commission
DGs and because the proposal was written ‘in a way poli-
cymakers can understand and are able to draw their own
conclusions’ (Interview 5, see also Interview 18). ACER
was also credited by the Commission with providing ad-
ditional expertise, especially at the level of technical de-
tail. ACER’s ability to expand on and discuss the details
of energy-sector practices was seen by the Commission
as crucial to its work on rule harmonization (network
codes), and to the development of an internal energy
market in Europe. Both ACER and the EEAwere character-
ized as supporting the Commission’s work by providing
relevant information that the Commission found useful.
This is also indicated by the terminology that the Com-
mission used to describe EEA (‘advisory body’) and ACER
(‘service-provider’) in relation to the Commission.
In general, it cannot be assumed that the Commis-
sion will automatically consider information provided by
EU agencies as useful, even though agency expertise is a
key rationale behind agencification. The mere presence
of expert information from EU agencies is not always suf-
ficient. To some extent, the differences in the type of ex-
pertise held by the agencies as compared to that of the
Commission could even be a challenge. Differing perspec-
tives did not always result in a well-targeted input from
ACER to the Commission. It was also noted that the input
format—formal, relatively technical reports—was not al-
ways tailored to the Commission as an ‘audience’, which
would have preferred amore political narrative in ACER’s
technical reports (Interview 12). On the other hand, the
EEA ensured not only that additional expertise would be
supplied, but also that it would be delivered in a for-
mat appropriate to the Commission’s needs. The EEA has
learned to provide targeted information—even develop-
ing formal routines for this. Summing up, we find that
both the EEA andACERhave gradually accumulated expe-
rience in how to deliver their inputs to the Commission.
4. Conclusions: EU Agencies as Assets, but not without
Pitfalls
What does agencification entail for EU energy and cli-
mate policy—and more broadly, for the development
of an Energy Union? EU agencies are positioned to of-
fer technical information with a European perspective,
and as such represent a valuable source of relevant in-
formation that the Commission can apply in developing
new policies or preparing legislation for implementation.
Being required to work with various actors operating at
different levels, EU agencies are often better informed
about, for instance, European energy and environmen-
tal issues than other actors. For example, we found that
the EEA was seen as a highly legitimate entity that pro-
vided impartial expertise in a way that helped policymak-
ers to grasp the deep complexity and uncertainty of the
issues at hand. As one member of the EEA stated: ‘our
strength comes from the fact that we as EEA are seen as
independent actors who do not pursue their own inter-
ests or lobbying in the broadest sense, and who cooper-
ate very closely with their network’ (Interview 8).
Being able to draw on expert knowledge has become
central to policymakers in legitimizing their decisions be-
cause it lends authority to policy positions, helping to
substantiate specific preferences in case of political con-
testation (Boswell, 2008). According to Riley and Brophy-
Baermann, ‘it isn´t so much the possession of expert
knowledge but the reaction to—respect for—that knowl-
edge that gives an agency power’ (2006, p. 99). Gener-
ally, agencification signals independent expertise. In de-
liberative settings, access to agency expertise should give
the Commission added leverage. The Commission may
strategically exploit information provided by EU agen-
cies to strengthen its position in the policy-making pro-
cess (e.g., Groenleer, 2009). Put differently, ‘the more
technical and complicated the matter becomes, the less
politicians and lawyers will dare contest the Agency’s
opinion’ (van Ooik, 2005, p. 141)—and thus, that of
the Commission.
Our findings do not necessarily mean Commission
dominance, however. Scholars have argued that the rise
of EU agencies has come at the expense of the Commis-
sion. Bickerton et al. (2015) see EU agencies as a compro-
mise whereby EU integration is not accompanied with
new competences to the Commission, and that EU agen-
cies become empowered instead of there being further
expansion of the Commission. Even if EU agencies were
to become the ‘extended arm’ of the Commission, mem-
ber states have their own public administrations. Rather
than giving the Commission an information advantage,
EU agencies might reduce the Commission’s information
disadvantage vis-à-vis member states.
We found that both ACER and EEA offered in-depth
expertise that aided the Commission, enabling it to de-
velop detailed, specific energy, climate and environmen-
tal policies. By being able to draw on expert information
organized at the EU level, which entails more consistent
data collection and analysis, the Commission is better po-
sitioned not only to make policy changes at the level of
goals and instruments, but also to go into greater detail
by developing changes at the level of instrument settings
(Hall, 1993). This is amajor advantage to the Commission,
enabling it to bring EU agencies as technical experts to its
negotiations with the member states.
However, agency expertise may be strategically pre-
sented as more independent than it actually is. The au-
tonomy of agencies is often seen as important for their
provision of independent expertise. However, the level
of formal autonomy varies across EU agencies (Wonka &
Rittberger, 2010). Low agency autonomy is often seen as
being in conflict with independent expertise, because it
allows agencies less leeway to adjust how they conduct
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their work (Wonka & Rittberger, 2010). ACER and EEA
have low levels of formal autonomy (see Wonka & Rit-
tberger, 2010; own calculations)2. With low autonomy
(formally or in practice), commitment is likely to be less
credible, and the agency more likely to be responsive
to the interests of one or more of its principals. Indeed,
both EEA and ACER have sought to improve targeting of
the information that they provided to the Commission.
Although this could facilitate the delivery of information
considered useful by the Commission, an agency’s dis-
tance from politics might be less than officially recog-
nized and its expertise less independent.
Commission reliance on EU agencies is not without
pitfalls. As the relations between a Commission DG and
an EU agency mimic domestic ministry–agency relations,
challenges familiar from the study of principal–agent re-
lations arise. Amajor risk is shirking by the agent—in this
case a EU agency—also known as ‘agency drift’: EU agen-
ciesmay develop an institutional self-interest and exploit
the information asymmetry vis-à-vis the principal to pur-
sue other goals than those it was established by the
same principal to achieve (Elgie, 2002). In recent years,
EU agencies have successively expanded their compe-
tencies and reinterpreted their role (Egeberg, Martens,
& Trondal, 2012; Maggetti, 2009). There are indications
that EU agencies sometimes follow their own agenda
even as they aid the Commission. We found that ACER
and the EEA held their own views on several topics. ACER
both anticipated what might interest the Commission
(e.g., as regards market monitoring reports), but also
held its own views (according to Interview 11).Moreover,
ACER was beginning to draw out the more political mes-
sages from their technical analyses, as could be observed
in the subsequent launch of a forward-looking strategy
paper on the internal energy market (ACER, 2014). This
development occurred even though ACER was heavily
regulated and faced resource constraints, which should
have limited its capacity to launch political initiatives.
Our interviewees made similar statements on a more ac-
tive role concerning the EEA. Our findings indicate that
agencies have become more than mere generators of
information: they play roles of tremendous significance,
perhaps beyond what policymakers originally foresaw.
Thus, information from EU agencies may help the
Commission to build an Energy Union, but EU agencies
might seek to pull it in another direction than that envis-
aged by the Commission. Over time, EU agencies taking
action could shape the kinds of issues that are debated,
how issues are framed, and the attention paid to vari-
ous issues. Future research should examine whether EU
agencies with higher autonomy contribute in ways simi-
lar to the two agencies studied here, or are more prone
to drift. The study of the political role of EU agencies is
an emerging field for research, where EU agencies could
be re-conceptualized as strategic actors, as attention-
seeking policy advocates who actively participate in (in-
direct) policymaking while employing their own agen-
das. Concerning the Commission side, scholars should ex-
plore to what extent it relies on agency input relative to
other sources of information such as expert groups, con-
sultants and public consultations. In sum, more research
is needed on howEUagencies operate in practice, aswell
as on the development of the relationship between EU
agencies and the Commission, which, as noted by Tron-
dal and Peters (2013) together comprise an important
part of the EU administrative space.
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